

Beirut, 5/10/2026

**To the Secretary-General of the United Nations
And to the esteemed members of the United Nations Security Council**

Subject: Request to reconsider Resolution 2790/2025 in light of the impossibility of implementing its mechanism and the risks of its enforcement to international peace and security.

Greetings,

Resolution 2790 (2025) of the Security Council adopted on August 28, 2025, extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the last time until December 31, 2026, and stipulated that the UNIFIL would begin its orderly and safe drawdown and withdrawal from Lebanon within one year, starting from that date. However, subsequent developments on the ground have shown that the conditions stipulated in this process have not been met, and that implementing the withdrawal mechanism in its current form could lead to results contrary to the purpose for which the resolution was adopted.

This is particularly important because paragraph 1 of the resolution stipulates that the withdrawal must be carried out in accordance with the conditions set forth in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8, while paragraph 5 requires that it be conducted in close consultation with the Government of Lebanon and in an orderly and safe manner. Consequently, the timetable cannot be interpreted in isolation from the conditions of safety, consultation, and the actual transfer of responsibilities, nor can it be viewed as an automatic procedure separate from the objective defined by the resolution.

Resolution 2790/2025 does not treat UNIFIL's withdrawal as an independent objective, but rather links it to a comprehensive process based on the withdrawal of Israeli forces north of the Blue Line, the deployment of Lebanese authorities, and the Lebanese government's extension of its control over all its territory and the exercise of its full sovereignty, so that the Lebanese state becomes the sole authority responsible for security in South Lebanon. The resolution explicitly states that the goal of an orderly and secure withdrawal is to make the Lebanese government the sole authority responsible for security in southern Lebanon, and it links this to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the positions they occupy within Lebanese territory and the deployment of Lebanese authorities therein.

This objective is consistent with the foundation upon which UNIFIL was established and for which it was created under Resolution 425/1978 , which defined its purpose as confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring security and stability, and assisting the Lebanese government in restoring its effective authority in the area. Therefore, just as UNIFIL's presence is not an end in itself, its withdrawal cannot become an end separate from the outcomes for which the force was originally established.

Resolution 1701 (2006) also clearly enshrined the principle of the Lebanese government extending its control over all its territory and exercising its sovereignty, and linked the deployment of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon, and called for there to be no weapons or authority in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River except those belonging to the Lebanese government and UNIFIL.

This conclusion is reinforced by paragraph 10 of resolution 2790 (2025), which requested the Secretary-General to explore, no later than 1 June 2026, options concerning the future of the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). Following UNIFIL's withdrawal, options for security assistance, monitoring the Blue Line, and ways to enhance support for the redeployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River through UN mechanisms are being considered. This explicit mandate underscores that post-withdrawal arrangements are not a closed matter or a rigid mechanism, but rather a subject of assessment and options that must be based on the realities on the ground and the requirements of maintaining international peace and security.

Therefore, the legal logic of the Security Council resolution is not based on a complete withdrawal but rather on a transfer of responsibility: an Israeli withdrawal, followed by a Lebanese deployment and the effective restoration of sovereignty and authority, then the transfer of security responsibility to the Lebanese state. Once these conditions are met, UNIFIL's withdrawal becomes a natural consequence.

If UNIFIL withdraws while Lebanese areas remain outside the Lebanese state's actual ability to access and exercise its authority over them, then the withdrawal will not be a transfer of responsibility to the state, but will turn into a security and field vacuum, leaving Lebanese lands under occupation, and putting the Lebanese army in contact with the occupying forces, which threatens international peace and security, contradicting the basic purpose of the UN resolutions related to Lebanon.

Furthermore, the resolution may not be interpreted or implemented in a manner that gives any legal effect to a reality arising from the use of force or effectively establishes it, in accordance with the principle of respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of States stipulated in Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, and with the resolution itself affirming respect for Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political unity within its internationally recognized borders.

This problem is further compounded by the current situation. Resolution 2790 itself calls on Israel to withdraw north of the Blue Line, including the five positions located inside Lebanese territory, and calls on the Lebanese authorities to deploy there with temporary support from UNIFIL. However, in reality, statements were issued by Israel in 2026 confirming its intention to maintain control over a large portion of the Lebanese territory. According to published reports, the Israeli Defense Minister declared that the area controlled by Israel in southern Lebanon is no less than 700 square kilometers. These figures, issued by Israeli sources, clearly indicate that the reality on the ground, which the withdrawal process is supposed to entail, remains fundamentally contested.

In this context, a general political assessment of the extent to which the conditions for withdrawal have been met is insufficient. Objective and verifiable field criteria must be adopted, including, in particular: the extent of the actual Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory; the Lebanese army's ability to gain safe and continuous access to and deployment in all relevant areas; the return of the civilian population; guarantees of freedom of movement and humanitarian access; and the availability of the necessary resources and capabilities to enable state institutions to assume full security responsibility. These criteria should be subject to prior international verification before any step whose consequences cannot be undone.

Therefore, the deployment of the Lebanese army and the restoration of the state's full authority in South Lebanon cannot be merely a legal presumption or a theoretical commitment. It presupposes the actual ability to access all Lebanese territories and exercise authority therein. If Lebanese areas remain under Israeli occupation or military control, and the Lebanese state is unable to access them or assume its responsibilities, then UNIFIL's withdrawal from its positions will not constitute a genuine transfer of responsibility to the state. Instead, it will create a security and field vacuum along the Blue Line and the Lebanese border, increasing the risk of friction and escalation rather than mitigating it.

The issue is not limited to the security dimension. Resolution 2790 stipulates that UNIFIL is authorized, during the withdrawal period, to fulfill functions related to

the protection of civilians and the safe civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance. Consequently, the end of UNIFIL's presence in areas inaccessible to the Lebanese state will lead to the closure of safe corridors, isolate villages from the rest of Lebanon, and endanger the sick, the wounded, the ambulances, the aid, and other essential services. Protecting civilians and ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance are fundamental elements of any responsible withdrawal, and these must not be left in a vacuum due to the absence of an entity capable of access and protection.

Paragraph 6 of the resolution outlined specific functions for UNIFIL during the withdrawal phase, including providing security for UN personnel, facilities, and convoys; extracting humanitarian workers in danger; providing medical support; and contributing to the protection of civilians and the safe civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, the termination of these functions without a capable and effective replacement does not simply constitute the administrative end of an international mission, but rather creates a protection gap that contradicts the safeguards established by the resolution itself for the responsible and safe management of the withdrawal.

Herein lies the responsibility of the Security Council under Article 24 of the UN Charter, which entrusts it with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and mandates, indeed requires, it to exercise this responsibility in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Furthermore, by virtue of its mandate, the Security Council has the authority to determine the operational mechanisms of the United Nations as it deems appropriate in light of the prevailing circumstances.

Article 99 of the Charter also authorizes the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which he believes may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Since paragraph 15 of resolution 2790 (2025) requested the Secretary-General to continue reporting to the Council every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate, the legal and institutional pathway is available for the submission of a special and urgent report outlining the impact of new developments on the feasibility of a safe withdrawal and presenting the options set out in paragraph 10 before the start of the withdrawal on 31 December 2026.

Therefore, the changed circumstances presupposed by Resolution 2790, and the inability to fulfill the conditions upon which the withdrawal process is based, legally and practically justify a reassessment of the implementation mechanism and its timing. This reassessment must ensure its consistency with the resolution's

objective and the Security Council's responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Reconsidering the implementation mechanism does not imply invalidating or abandoning the resolution; rather, it means adapting its implementation to the new reality, thereby preventing any of its mechanisms from leading to an outcome that contradicts the resolution's intended purpose.

The reconsideration is not presented as a means of challenging the decision, but rather as a subsequent and legitimate undertaking of the Security Council's ongoing authority to amend or supplement implementation mechanisms with a new resolution when circumstances change. This is further emphasized by paragraph 16 of the resolution, which explicitly stipulates that the matter remains under the Council's active consideration.

Therefore, the request is for the Security Council to urgently reconsider Resolution 2790/2025, particularly the withdrawal mechanism and its timing, and to take whatever new resolution or appropriate measure is necessary to ensure that UNIFIL does not withdraw, at least from the areas where the Lebanese state has not yet effectively restored its authority and sovereignty, so that ending UNIFIL's presence does not lead to a security or humanitarian vacuum, or to a vacuum on the Blue Line, or to leaving Lebanese territory under Israeli occupation or military control indefinitely without the presence of separation and monitoring forces between the two parties.

This requires, in particular, that the Security Council request the Secretary-General to submit a special report before December 31, 2026, including a documented assessment of the extent to which the conditions for the transfer of responsibility have been met and the options for implementing paragraph 10; that the Council establish objective criteria for the commencement of the withdrawal and its phases; and that, if these criteria are not met, the Council decides to postpone the commencement of the withdrawal or suspend its phase in the areas concerned, or to establish a subsequent UN mechanism with specific powers and duration to ensure the monitoring of the Blue Line, the protection of civilians, and the support of the deployment of the Lebanese army, until the Lebanese state effectively and exclusively assumes these responsibilities.

At the same time, it must be clear and unequivocal that the ultimate goal of the required UN arrangement is not to replace the Lebanese state with UNIFIL, nor to maintain a permanent international presence, but rather to enable the Lebanese state to assume security responsibilities throughout its territory, particularly in the south, exclusively through its legitimate forces and constitutional and legal institutions. The withdrawal must not result in any security or military

responsibility or armed authority being left to any entity other than the Lebanese state, nor should it be interpreted in any way as acceptance of the continued presence of any armed force or military or security authority outside the state's institutions. The principle of the state's exclusivity as to the security, the arms, and the authority is the outcome that any UN process must lead to, not an outcome that can be postponed or replaced by de facto arrangements. This aligns with the objective enshrined in Resolutions 1701 and 2790 of achieving a situation where no weapons or authority exist outside the control of the Lebanese government.

In order for any extension or subsequent arrangement not to become a permanent alternative to the state, it should be accompanied by a specific timeframe, periodic review, clear performance indicators, and must end automatically upon the achievement of a full Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of the Lebanese army, and the restoration of the state's effective and exclusive capacity for security, administration, and humanitarian access throughout the entire area concerned.

Any ongoing UN role necessitated by practical and field requirements must be temporary, specific, clear, and dedicated exclusively to supporting the Lebanese state and enabling it to restore its full authority through monitoring, verification, reporting, contributing to preventing escalation, protecting civilians, securing humanitarian corridors, and supporting the deployment of the Lebanese army, until the responsibility for security across all its territory is effectively and definitively transferred to the Lebanese state alone.

Reconsidering Resolution 2790 is not a reversal of a decision taken by the Security Council, but rather an undertaking of the Council's responsibility to maintain international peace and security in light of the inability to implement its resolution mechanism in a way that achieves its purpose, and to protect the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese state, and to prevent the implementation of a UN resolution from leading to a result that contradicts the principles and goals of the United Nations.

The implementation of a Security Council resolution must not lead to a security vacuum, a humanitarian vacuum, a vacuum on the Blue Line, the perpetuation of the occupation, or the weakening of the authority of the Lebanese state, which would threaten international peace and security. Rather, it must lead to full Lebanese sovereignty, exclusive state authority, protected borders, and preserved security and stability within the framework of international legitimacy.

Hence, reconsidering Resolution 2790 has become a legal and practical necessity imposed by the Security Council's responsibility for the consequences of implementing its resolution, before its enforcement in the current circumstances leads to exposing international peace and security to the gravest risks, and to placing the United Nations, as a result, in a position that contradicts the principles and purposes for which it was established to protect.